نامشخص
AliAkbbar
EyzadyFard
Mazandarun
author
text
article
2007
per
This research addresses the theory of Financial Compensation of Intellectual Damage in Islamic Law.
After defining intellectual damage as damaging one s soul body reputation sentiments emotions mind art and personal freedoms the researcher of this paper employs the humanisitic concepts ethical system and legal principles the theory. Through widespread research into the principle of ni harm consideration of its issuance exigencies application of harm and damage ti the intellectual compensation the possibility of proving the verdict and in regard to the philosophy of its establishment he goes on to view the compensation of intellectual damage as necessary by means of known methods one if which is the financial compensation.
Given the application of the epithet of distress and constriction to many of the istances of intellectual compensation and the reliability of proving the legal verdict like the principle of ni harm ghe principle of negating distress and constriction signifies financial compensation of intellectual damage.
Fiqh and Usul
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2008-9139
39
v.
3
no.
2007
9
28
https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_35603_c2aff2c873e7b2c73d4afe26c5da53a8.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22067/jfu.v39i3.66415
نامشخص
Abbas
Zeraat
Kashan
author
text
article
2007
per
توبه، یکی از عوامل بازگشت به خداست که آثار دنیوی نیز دارد و در مواردی حد را ساقط می کند، اما بسیاری از احکام آن مشخص نیست. در این مقاله سعی داریم به مباحثی دربارۀ توبه بپردازیم که مورد بحث قرار نگرفته یا کمتر در مورد آن بحث شده است؛ از جمله اینکه توبه اختصاص به حد خاصی ندارد بلکه می توان آن را به همه حدود و حتی تعزیرات تسری داد و مقررات شکلی حدود تابع قواعد. عمومی است و در موارد مسکوت عنه باید به منابع شرعی مراجعه کرد و اینکه نهاد توبه در معنای عام آن اختصاص به حقوق ما ندارد، بلکه در سایر نظامهای حقوقی هم از آن استفاده می شود و وسیله ای برای احراز اصلاح مجرم و بازدارندگی وی از تکرار جرم، و اماره فقدان حالت خطرناک در مجرم می باشد.
Fiqh and Usul
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2008-9139
39
v.
3
no.
2007
29
54
https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_35609_6a89f4328956e6f0f63a786b6277a2f6.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22067/jfu.v39i3.66421
Intellectual Rights and the Legal Works
ʿAbbās ʿAlī
Sultānī
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
author
Murtaḍā
Raḥīmī
Shiraz University
author
text
article
2007
per
The issue of intellectual rights in the legal works has, due to its importance and long history in jurisprudence and Islamic culture, received much attention by the Shī‘a and Sunnī jurists, and has been subsumed under a special heading. Some of the Sunnī jurists have distinguished between legal and non-legal works, considering the works of the authors of legal works as non-legal and those of others as legal, even if created by a Muslim. Similarly, in case a non-Muslim undertakes to write legal works in relation to Islam, his financial rights are respected and approved, which is an indication of the Muslims' special concern with the promotion of Islam and its values. Thereupon, the present paper, while explaining the legal works, reviews the reasons of the opponents of financial rights of these works and asserts that although legal works enjoy special importance and status, there is no difference between the legal and non-legal works in terms of legality of financial rights, and the reasons proving intellectual property rights would similarly prove as legal the financial rights of both kinds of works. In one aspect, the necessity of fulfilling the intellectual or moral rights in regard to all works, including legal and non-legal, has been agreed upon and even the rights of the legal works have been accepted with more sensitivity by general public, even by the opponents of the financial rights of intellectual works.
Fiqh and Usul
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2008-9139
39
v.
3
no.
2007
55
85
https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_35617_72d56acc3bb09ad0072b67b899ab3d94.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22067/jfu.v39i3.65663
نامشخص
Hossin
Saberi
Ferdowsi
author
text
article
2007
per
نوشتار حاضر، با عنایت به ضرورت بررسی رهن مستغلات و تصحیح شیوۀ موجود در جامعه، بیع شرط را به عنوان یکی از ساز و کارهای مشروع چنین رهنی که به هدف استرباح و نیز حلیت استیفای منافع صورت می پذیرد بررسیده است. مولف، پس از تعریف لغوی «بیع الخیار» - که در ادبیات کهن فقهی ما به جای آنچه امروزه آن را بیع شرط می نامند به کار می رفته – با اشاره به تحول معنایی این ادبیات از بیع خیار به بیع شرط، از روشهای تصور شرط خیار و رد ثمن سخن به میان آورده، و آن گاه اشکالهای وارد بر این مقوله و سپس ادلّۀ صحت و جواز بیع خیار را فراوری نهاده، و در ادامه با نگاهی گذرا به مقولۀ بیع وفاۀ در فقه اهل سنت کوشیده است راهی به انطباق این دو مفهوم بر یکدیگر بیابد، و از این رهگذر این برداشت را بر کسی داوری نشاند که بیع شرط می تواند به عنوان ساز و کاری جایگزین برای آنچه امروزی در عرف به نام رهن مستغلات انجام می گیرد مورد توجه واقع شود.
Fiqh and Usul
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2008-9139
39
v.
3
no.
2007
87
115
https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_35627_6a0251137c53b227f23bfa0c288c6e87.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22067/jfu.v39i3.66426
A Deliberation on the Initiative Jihād of Calling to Islam
Muḥammad Taqī
Fakhla‘ī
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
author
text
article
2007
per
Among different kinds of jihād (holy struggle), da‘wa (calling to Islam) has for centuries filled up legal sources with discussions. According to the legal popular belief, war against all kinds of infidels is obligatory and that they have to either convert to Islam or accept the consequences of war, such as murder, etc. only people of the Scripture are offered a third alternative, known as protective (dhimma) covenant. Apart from the feasibility of this phenomenon in the present human society, its theoretical foundations require accurate survey, too. What this paper is putting forward, following an accurate study of jihād arguments in the Qur'an, Sunna, and Sīra, is that the popular legal impression concerning jihād of da‘wa has been based on several obliged and unprovable issues such as adhering to the jihād generalities and expanding of claims of abrogation, and flourished through the ignorance of the rational and epistemic fundamentals and principles in the process of inference and the historical circumstances of legislation of jihād ; hence, a forged and indefensible issue, unless a new legal version of it is presented, which will inevitably be in contrast to the popular perception.
Fiqh and Usul
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2008-9139
39
v.
3
no.
2007
117
155
https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_35635_27e1023b6a5c35b7d42170b8e6ebe700.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22067/jfu.v39i3.65665
Theory of Coercive Affirmation as Reflected in Comparisons
Jalīl
Qanawātī
Tehran University
author
text
article
2007
per
In Islamic jurisprudence (in Imāmī, Shāfi‘ī, and Ḥanafī legal schools), it is accepted as a rule that as long as the intention of creation and the agreement of the party to a contract is not supplemented to ījāb (affirmation, offer), no legal right will take effect, and the affirmer (mūjib) can withdraw from his affirmation any time before acceptance, with no responsibility ensued for his withdrawal. In contrast, the Mālikī jurists maintain that the announcer of ījāb can not withdraw his ījāb before the acceptance by the addressee. To their opinion, the announcer of ījāb creates by his announcement the right to accept and possession for the other person (i.e., the addresser), and the latter must be able to utilize this right. For this reason, the affirmer does not have the right to withdraw from his affirmation, and in case of withdrawing, his withdrawal would be invalid. This viewpoint is compatible with what is generally accepted in western law. In written legal systems and in some common law countries, the theory of coercive affirmation is accepted as an inalienable legal rule in law. Imam Khumayni, from among the eminent Imāmī jurists, believes concerning the function of ījāb in conclusion of an agreement that the simple affirmative creation (inshā’) is sufficient for the realization of a contract, and that acceptance has no function except in establishing the dealt transaction and accepting the creation of the announcer of ījāb. Nevertheless, he believes that ījāb is not coercive and the mūjib can withdraw from his ījāb any time before acceptance.
It seems that from the viewpoint of logics of law and argument procedure no certified reasons can be presented for the theory of coercive affirmation (ījāb-i mulzim), and the acceptance of this theory faces difficulty in the realm of primary ordinances and rules.
Fiqh and Usul
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2008-9139
39
v.
3
no.
2007
157
179
https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_35644_2318699da36623e8a4b42615509e5ca9.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22067/jfu.v39i3.65666
The Theory of Financial Compensation of Intellectual Damage in Islamic Law
Abu'l Ghāsim
Naqībī
Shahid Mutahhari College
author
text
article
2007
per
This research addresses the theory of "Financial Compensation of Intellectual Damage" in Islamic law. After defining intellectual damage as damaging one's soul, body, reputation, sentiments, emotions, mind, art, and personal freedoms, the researcher of this paper employs the humanistic concepts, ethical system, and legal principles by virtue of library and jurisprudential methodology to prove the theory. Through widespread research into the principle of no harm, consideration of its issuance exigencies, application of harm and damage to the intellectual compensation, the possibility of proving the verdict, and in regard to the essence and criterion included in the above principle, as well as the philosophy of its establishment, he goes on to view the compensation of intellectual damage as necessary by means of known methods, one of which is the financial compensation. Given the application of the epithet of distress and constriction to many of the instances of intellectual compensation and the reliability of proving the legal verdict like the principle of no harm, the principle of negating distress and constriction signifies financial compensation of intellectual damage.
Fiqh and Usul
Ferdowsi University of Mashhad
2008-9139
39
v.
3
no.
2007
181
215
https://jfiqh.um.ac.ir/article_35653_4b674b5e3d986a9e522243188132cf7f.pdf
dx.doi.org/10.22067/jfu.v39i3.65667