The word madhāq (taste, perceptive aptitude) in its compound form madhāq-i shari‘at (religious law taste) or madhāq-i shāri‘ (lawmaker’s taste) and the like, have been employed by the Imāmī jurists and theologians for about two centuries. However, no clear definition has been presented for it so far; and this has caused the term, which has had extensive and significant use in the field of inference, to fade into obscurity and ambiguity.
The jurists’ apprehension over centuries up to now has been about achieving inference of rulings through reliable legal ways, and to utilize specific proofs on some occasions, and general proofs on other. They have not contented themselves with these two types of proofs and obtained principles beyond laws from the lawmakers’ characteristics, procedures, and behaviors in legislation that, although they have not found a proof for the ruling from the former two types, they have achieved certainty in its confirmation or negation in a positive way. They have found those principles through a collection of rulings rather than from single propositions.
It is attempted in this writing to prove the association of the term madhāq-i shāri‘at with more antiquated concepts found in legal language and the books of earlier jurists. In the meantime, while quoting and criticizing the viewpoints existing in madhāq-i shāri‘at (such as reliance on religious law, general public’s interests, and trends of speech), a new definition is presented of
this term and, in conclusion, the functions of madhāq-i shāri‘at in the process of reference is dealt with.
Keywords: taste, religious law, jurisprudence, caution, habit, wont (da’b), reliance, context.
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