The Study of the Basic Difference of Accepting the Authority of Appearance in Speech and Actions

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Master degree of Fiqh and Islamic Law.of Jurisprudence and Principles of Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology & Islamic Studies, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

2 Assistant Professor of Department of Jurisprudence and Principles of Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology & Islamic Studies, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

3 Assistant Professor of Department of Jurisprudence and Principles of Islamic Law, Faculty of Theology & Islamic Studies, Shahid Chamran University of Ahvaz, Ahvaz, Iran

Abstract

In the books on the principles of jurisprudence, there is extensive discussion regarding the authority of the apparent meanings of words. The prominent jurists, based on their intellectual foundations, have accepted the authority of the apparent meanings of words, and numerous legal and judicial rulings have been based on this view. However, there has been less debate and more disagreement regarding the authority of the apparent meanings of actions. This paper is aimed at analytically and descriptively investigating the aforementioned issue and explaining the reasons for the skepticism concerning the authority of the apparent meanings of actions, despite the consensus on the authority of the apparent meanings of words. Although the non-conventional nature of the indication of actions towards meanings, the uncertainty of the evidence, and the lack of clear principles for reference in cases of doubt make it difficult to consider the apparent meanings of actions as authorized, it seems that by adopting Martyr Sadr’s theory on probabilities, a way can be provided to revise the instances of the authority of the apparent meanings of actions. Accordingly, the apparent meanings of actions, if they create subjective certainty and convincingly indicate a meaning, can be used as the basis for the judge’s knowledge.

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Articles in Press, Accepted Manuscript
Available Online from 13 October 2024
  • Receive Date: 05 April 2024
  • Revise Date: 11 June 2024
  • Accept Date: 13 October 2024